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termux-sync: Arbitrary file write during restore via attacker-controlled manifest source path

termux-sync restore trusts fields inside an untrusted backup manifest and uses them as the extraction destination without validation. During restore, each archive entry is handled as: src_dir = Path(info.get("source", …)).parent extract_archive(archive, src_dir, …) extract_archive opens the archive and runs tarfile.extract for every member with no path jail and no filter: with tarfile.open(archive_path, "r:*") as tf: for member in tf.getmembers(): tf.extract(member, dest_path, set_attrs=True) There is no check that manifest "source" stays …

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Two LiteLLM versions published containing credential harvesting malware

After an API Token exposure from an exploited trivy dependency, two new releases of litellm were uploaded to PyPI containing automatically activated malware, harvesting sensitive credentials and files, and exfiltrating to a remote API. Anyone who has installed and run the project should assume any credentials available to litellm environment may have been exposed, and revoke/rotate thema ccordingly.