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vLLM: Mirrored multimodal IPC caches desync after a rejected request — a later request reusing the same media hash trips a receiver assertion in the engine core

vLLM's default multimodal cache (mm_processor_cache_type="lru") mirrors state across two processes: the frontend (P0) holds only metadata (MultiModalProcessorSenderCache) while the engine core (P1) holds the real payload (MultiModalReceiverCache). The design invariant is that get_and_update() runs on P0 and P1 in lockstep for every request, so eviction order stays mirrored and P0 can answer "is this cached in P1?" without talking to P1. That invariant breaks when a request is rejected after …

vLLM: Harmony tool continuations drop `cache_salt` — restoring a cross-tenant prefix-cache membership oracle

On the GPT-OSS "Harmony" path (POST /v1/responses), a request that uses a built-in or MCP tool runs as a multi-turn loop: after each tool call vLLM re-renders the full next-turn Harmony prompt and re-submits it to the engine. Turn 1 correctly carries request.cache_salt, but the tool-continuation re-submission rebuilds the engine input via tokens_input(token_ids) with no cache_salt. The continuation prefix is therefore cached in the global unsalted namespace even though the …

Werkzeug safe_join() allows Windows special device names

Werkzeug's safe_join function allows Windows device names as filenames when they have an empty ADS marker on NTFS. This was previously reported as https://github.com/pallets/werkzeug/security/advisories/GHSA-hgf8-39gv-g3f2, but the added filtering failed to account for the fact Windows allows special device names with an empty ADS marker, such as NUL:. send_from_directory uses safe_join to safely serve files at user-specified paths under a directory. If the application is running on Windows and NTFS, and …

vm2: util.getCallSites() bypasses GHSA-v27g-jcqj-v8rw host-frame redaction, leaks host call stack

NodeVM exposes the host util module to the sandbox through an unfiltered shallow copy (Object.assign({}, util)). On Node.js >= 22.9 this hands sandboxed code util.getCallSites(), a programmatic stack-introspection API that returns the host process's full call stack — absolute file paths, function names, and line numbers — including vm2 bridge internals and the embedding application's entrypoint. This bypasses the host-frame redaction established in GHSA-v27g-jcqj-v8rw, which only covers the Error.prepareStackTrace channel.

vm2: timeout Option Bypass via FinalizationRegistry Cleanup Callback (Unbounded Host Event-Loop Block)

vm2's VM({ timeout }) option is documented and relied upon as the mechanism that bounds how long sandboxed code may execute. In the current implementation, the timeout only wraps the single synchronous call to VM#run() (via doWithTimeout → this._runScript(script) in lib/vm.js). It does not, and structurally cannot, bound code that the V8 engine itself schedules to run after that call has already returned. FinalizationRegistry and WeakRef are exposed to sandboxed …

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Two LiteLLM versions published containing credential harvesting malware

After an API Token exposure from an exploited trivy dependency, two new releases of litellm were uploaded to PyPI containing automatically activated malware, harvesting sensitive credentials and files, and exfiltrating to a remote API. Anyone who has installed and run the project should assume any credentials available to litellm environment may have been exposed, and revoke/rotate thema ccordingly.