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Vyper: Return inside for loop more than 1 level deep

Impact is minor, it is unlikely a user would encounter this problem unless they were working with nested calls, and return statements inside calls. Even in that scenario, you would encounter a revert which should be noticeable with adequate testing. In limited circumstances, this could cause a DoS attack for public contracts under certain conditions.

Vyper: Memory corruption using function calls within tuples / nested calls

When performing a function call inside a tuple or as an argument inside another function call, there is a memory corruption issue that occurs because of an incorrect pointer to the the tip of the stack. Example code: @internal def _foo(a: uint256, b: uint256, c: uint256) -> (uint256, uint256, uint256, uint256, uint256): return 1, a, b, c, 5 @internal def _foo2() -> uint256: a: uint256[10] = [6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,15,16] return 4 @external …

Vyper: Call stack corruption when passing complex type containing non-base type members as argument

When we pass a multi-dimensional array (like [[1, 2], [3, 4]]) as an argument to internal/external functions we get incorrect output. This is due to a stack management issue, because it was assumed that the size of each subtype of an array/struct is 32, which is not always correct. Example code: @internal def test_input(arr: int128[2][1], i: int128) -> (int128[2][1], int128): return arr, i @external def test_values(arr: int128[2][1], i: int128) -> …

vLLM: Mirrored multimodal IPC caches desync after a rejected request — a later request reusing the same media hash trips a receiver assertion in the engine core

vLLM's default multimodal cache (mm_processor_cache_type="lru") mirrors state across two processes: the frontend (P0) holds only metadata (MultiModalProcessorSenderCache) while the engine core (P1) holds the real payload (MultiModalReceiverCache). The design invariant is that get_and_update() runs on P0 and P1 in lockstep for every request, so eviction order stays mirrored and P0 can answer "is this cached in P1?" without talking to P1. That invariant breaks when a request is rejected after …

vLLM: Harmony tool continuations drop `cache_salt` — restoring a cross-tenant prefix-cache membership oracle

On the GPT-OSS "Harmony" path (POST /v1/responses), a request that uses a built-in or MCP tool runs as a multi-turn loop: after each tool call vLLM re-renders the full next-turn Harmony prompt and re-submits it to the engine. Turn 1 correctly carries request.cache_salt, but the tool-continuation re-submission rebuilds the engine input via tokens_input(token_ids) with no cache_salt. The continuation prefix is therefore cached in the global unsalted namespace even though the …

shell-quote: `quote()` command injection via a line terminator in a token after a `{ comment }` token

quote() emits a { comment } token as # followed by its text, which comments out the rest of the shell line, including the opening quote of any later string token. A line terminator in that later string ends the comment, and the rest of the string is parsed as shell input: quote(['echo', 'ok', { comment: 'x' }, 'a\nid;#']); // echo ok #x 'a // id;#' Passed to sh, bash, …

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Two LiteLLM versions published containing credential harvesting malware

After an API Token exposure from an exploited trivy dependency, two new releases of litellm were uploaded to PyPI containing automatically activated malware, harvesting sensitive credentials and files, and exfiltrating to a remote API. Anyone who has installed and run the project should assume any credentials available to litellm environment may have been exposed, and revoke/rotate thema ccordingly.