Impact is minor, it is unlikely a user would encounter this problem unless they were working with nested calls, and return statements inside calls. Even in that scenario, you would encounter a revert which should be noticeable with adequate testing. In limited circumstances, this could cause a DoS attack for public contracts under certain conditions.
When performing a function call inside a tuple or as an argument inside another function call, there is a memory corruption issue that occurs because of an incorrect pointer to the the tip of the stack. Example code: @internal def _foo(a: uint256, b: uint256, c: uint256) -> (uint256, uint256, uint256, uint256, uint256): return 1, a, b, c, 5 @internal def _foo2() -> uint256: a: uint256[10] = [6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,15,16] return 4 @external …
When we pass a multi-dimensional array (like [[1, 2], [3, 4]]) as an argument to internal/external functions we get incorrect output. This is due to a stack management issue, because it was assumed that the size of each subtype of an array/struct is 32, which is not always correct. Example code: @internal def test_input(arr: int128[2][1], i: int128) -> (int128[2][1], int128): return arr, i @external def test_values(arr: int128[2][1], i: int128) -> …
vLLM's default multimodal cache (mm_processor_cache_type="lru") mirrors state across two processes: the frontend (P0) holds only metadata (MultiModalProcessorSenderCache) while the engine core (P1) holds the real payload (MultiModalReceiverCache). The design invariant is that get_and_update() runs on P0 and P1 in lockstep for every request, so eviction order stays mirrored and P0 can answer "is this cached in P1?" without talking to P1. That invariant breaks when a request is rejected after …
On the GPT-OSS "Harmony" path (POST /v1/responses), a request that uses a built-in or MCP tool runs as a multi-turn loop: after each tool call vLLM re-renders the full next-turn Harmony prompt and re-submits it to the engine. Turn 1 correctly carries request.cache_salt, but the tool-continuation re-submission rebuilds the engine input via tokens_input(token_ids) with no cache_salt. The continuation prefix is therefore cached in the global unsalted namespace even though the …
quote() emits a { comment } token as # followed by its text, which comments out the rest of the shell line, including the opening quote of any later string token. A line terminator in that later string ends the comment, and the rest of the string is parsed as shell input: quote(['echo', 'ok', { comment: 'x' }, 'a\nid;#']); // echo ok #x 'a // id;#' Passed to sh, bash, …
A memory-related vulnerability has been discovered and fixed in the upstream librsvg dependency. When certain runtime-specific conditions apply, this vulnerability can lead to possible remote code execution (RCE) on glibc-based Linux.
This is the same bug as Django had (CVE-2013-1443).