CVE-2026-62286: Dozzle label filters do not restrict container event and statistics streams

Dozzle supports per-user label filters in users.yml that are documented as an access-control boundary: “Filters are used to restrict the containers that a user can see” and “the guest user can only see containers with the label com.example.app … useful for restricting access to specific containers” (docs/guide/authentication.md). This is the mechanism operators use to give different users/tenants visibility into disjoint subsets of containers on the same host.

The events stream handler streamEvents (GET /api/events/stream) honors that filter for the initial container list and for the incremental containers-changed updates, but it forwards two other channels — container-stat (live per-container CPU, memory, network and disk telemetry) and container-event (container lifecycle events: start/die/destroy/rename/pause/unpause, with the container’s full attribute/label set) — to every authenticated client unconditionally, with no comparison against the caller’s label filter. The upstream subscription SubscribeEventsAndStats fans out across every Docker client/host and never receives a label filter at all.

As a result, any authenticated user — including one explicitly constrained to a single label scope — receives live resource telemetry for every container on every monitored host, plus lifecycle events carrying each container’s name, image and complete label map. This crosses the exact isolation boundary the filter feature is documented to enforce. The leak requires no special role (it is not gated behind the shell/actions/download roles) and works on the local Docker host, so it is distinct from the previously-patched agent-path exec/attach bypass (CVE-2026-24740 / GHSA-m855-r557-5rc5) and from the exec/attach CSWSH issue (CVE-2026-44985 / GHSA-j643-x8pv-8m67).