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CVE-2026-82406: Klever-Go: Zombie-order theft: `Buy` missing `IsClaimed` guard in native marketplace

September 23, 2026

Location: core/kapp/market/market.go — Buy() (approx. L281–436)
Severity: High

The native marketplace enforces an IsClaimed guard in Claim (market.go:752), CancelOrder (market.go:1125), and orderEscrowAmount (market.go:251), but not in Buy.

Marketplace escrow is virtual: the market KApp account never custodies currency. A bid burns funds from the bidder (bidderAcc.SubFromBalance, ~L378), and refunds/payouts mint to the recipient (AddToBalance, e.g. the prior-bidder refund at ~L349). Soundness depends on each order’s CurrentBid being paid out exactly once.

A seller can settle a resting-bid auction early via the seller-accept branch of Claim (~L776) → executeBuyMarket (~L656). That path sets IsClaimed=true, delivers the NFT, pays the seller, and re-saves the order (SetMarketOrder, ~L726) — but, unlike every other settle path, it does not reset EndTime (contrast immediate-buy Buy ~L416 and CancelOrder ~L1206), and no code path deletes the order. The result is a “zombie” order: already settled, yet still loadable with EndTime in the future and a stale CurrentBidder.

Because Buy has no IsClaimed guard, a new bidder can still Buy on that settled order (the bid guard at ~L317 only forces the new amount Y > CurrentBid X). The new bidder is debited Y; the prior bidder is refunded X (funded by the new bidder, not minted); the new bidder becomes CurrentBidder on an IsClaimed order and can then neither Claim (reverts on IsClaimed) nor CancelOrder (reverts on IsClaimed). Their funds are lost permanently.

Attack sequence (permissionless , anyone can create a sell order):

  1. Attacker (seller S) creates a resting-bid auction (Price=0, ReservePrice>0) for an NFT and self-bids X as bidder A (Sybil).
  2. S accepts A’s bid early via Claim → NFT goes to A (= attacker, keeps it), S (= attacker) collects the owner payout, order marked IsClaimed=true but left “live”.
  3. Victim B bids Y > X on the still-live-looking auction via Buy. Buy refunds prior bidder A the amount X (AddToBalance, L349) and burns Y from B (SubFromBalance, L378).
  4. B is now CurrentBidder on a claimed order and can neither Claim nor CancelOrder — both revert on IsClaimed. B’s Y is unrecoverable; X of it was siphoned to A; Y−X is destroyed.

References

  • github.com/advisories/GHSA-26r5-4mm2-px5c
  • github.com/klever-io/klever-go/commit/063bb3ed98f9a84a4b1f7286680613a5fc3c91b2
  • github.com/klever-io/klever-go/pull/16
  • github.com/klever-io/klever-go/releases/tag/v1.7.20
  • github.com/klever-io/klever-go/security/advisories/GHSA-26r5-4mm2-px5c
  • nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82406

Code Behaviors & Features

Detect and mitigate CVE-2026-82406 with GitLab Dependency Scanning

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Affected versions

All versions before 1.7.20

Fixed versions

  • 1.7.20

Solution

Upgrade to version 1.7.20 or above.

Impact 6.5 MEDIUM

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Learn more about CVSS

Weakness

  • CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow

Source file

go/github.com/klever-io/klever-go/CVE-2026-82406.yml

Spotted a mistake? Edit the file on GitLab.

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