Advisories for Cargo/Nimiq-Transaction package

The staking contract accepts UpdateValidator transactions that set new_voting_key=Some(…) while omitting new_proof_of_knowledge. this skips the proof-of-knowledge requirement that is needed to prevent BLS rogue-key attacks when public keys are aggregated. Because tendermint macro block justification verification aggregates validator voting keys and verifies a single aggregated BLS signature against that aggregate public key, a rogue-key voting key in the validator set can allow an attacker to forge a quorum-looking justification while …

HistoryTreeProof::verify panics on a malformed proof where history.len() != positions.len() due to assert_eq!(history.len(), positions.len()). The proof object is derived from untrusted p2p responses (ResponseTransactionsProof.proof) and is therefore attacker-controlled at the network boundary until validated. A malicious peer could trigger a crash by returning a crafted inclusion proof with a length mismatch.