Within the URI template implementation in Addressable, templates that put several variables in one expression generate regular expressions vulnerable to excessive backtracking: Expressions with any operator other than + and # (e.g., {/owner,repo,ref}, {.a,b}, {a,b,c}, {;a,b,c}). The values are joined by an optional separator, so a run of characters can be divided among the variables in O(n^k) ways for k variables. Expressions with the + or # operators and many …
Within the URI template implementation in Addressable, templates using the * (explode) modifier with the /, ., ;, ? or & operators (e.g., {/segments*}, {.ext*}, {;params*}, {?query*}) generate regular expressions vulnerable to catastrophic backtracking. When Template#match or Template#extract is called with a maliciously crafted URI that starts with the operator's leading character, matching takes exponential time, leading to uncontrolled resource consumption and denial of service. An input under 60 bytes …
Addressable::URI.normalize_path takes time quadratic in the number of nested dot segments in a path (e.g., "/" + "a/" * n + "../" * n, which for n = 3 is /a/a/a/../../../), because it removes one dot segment per pass over the whole path. URI#normalize, URI#normalized_path, URI#==, URI#=== and URI#join all call it. Normalizing, comparing or joining a URI taken from user input can result in uncontrolled resource consumption, leading to …
Addressable::URI.normalize_path resolves some paths containing .. segments to a different path than RFC 3986 does. When a path climbs above the root before any other .. is resolved, the segments that later .. segments should remove are instead kept: /../../public/x/../../secret normalizes to /public/x/secret instead of /secret. URI#normalize, URI#join, URI#== and URI#=== all use this normalization. An application that checks a normalized Addressable path against an allowlist, but sends the original …
Addressable::IDNA.to_unicode, in the pure-Ruby IDNA implementation, decodes Punycode labels (labels beginning with xn–) that are not valid A-labels. Those labels are returned in decoded form, when they should be returned unchanged. That includes: labels that decode to only ASCII characters, e.g. xn–google- decodes to google; labels that decode to text that doesn't convert back to the same label (RFC 3490 §4.2), e.g. text that isn't in normalized form. Addressable::URI#display_uri uses …
Addressable::IDNA.to_unicode decodes Punycode labels (labels beginning with xn–) that contain characters which change how text is displayed without being visible themselves. These include bidirectional controls such as U+202E RIGHT-TO-LEFT OVERRIDE and U+2066–U+2069, zero-width characters, and other invisible format characters. Addressable::URI#display_uri uses to_unicode, so it can display a host whose characters appear reordered or which looks identical to a different host. For example, the host of http://xn--abcmoc-dm0c.com/ is displayed as abc, …
Within the URI template implementation in Addressable, two classes of URI template generate regular expressions vulnerable to catastrophic backtracking: Templates using the * (explode) modifier with any expansion operator (e.g., {foo*}, {+var*}, {#var*}, {/var*}, {.var*}, {;var*}, {?var*}, {&var*}) generate patterns with nested unbounded quantifiers that are O(2^n) when matched against a maliciously crafted URI. Templates using multiple variables with the + or # operators (e.g., {+v1,v2,v3}) generate patterns with O(n^k) …