Advisories for Golang/Github.com/Amir20/Dozzle package

In a default dozzle deploy (the documented quickstart, no DOZZLE_AUTH_PROVIDER set), POST /api/notifications/test-webhook is reachable without authentication and forwards an attacker-controlled URL into a WebhookDispatcher that: Sends an HTTP POST to the supplied URL with attacker-controlled request headers, and Returns the response status code AND up to 1MB of the response body to the caller, when the target replies non-2xx. This is a classic full-reflection SSRF, pre-auth, against any IP/port …

The WebSocket upgrader for the /exec and /attach endpoints uses CheckOrigin: func(r *http.Request) bool { return true }, accepting upgrade requests from any origin. Combined with the JWT cookie using SameSite: Lax, this enables Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) — even when authentication is properly configured. An attacker hosting a page on a same-site origin (e.g., a sibling subdomain, or another service on localhost) can initiate a WebSocket connection to the …

A flaw in Dozzle’s agent-backed shell endpoints allows a user restricted by label filters (for example, label=env=dev) to obtain an interactive root shell in out‑of‑scope containers (for example, env=prod) on the same agent host by directly targeting their container IDs. Note: Tested on v9.0.2 likely affects all versions with agent mode support.

The app uses sha-256 as the hash for passwords. The app should switch to bcrypt.