A vulnerability exists in Babylon’s BLS vote extension processing where a malicious active validator can submit a VoteExtension with the block_hash field omitted from the protobuf serialization. Because protobuf fields are optional, unmarshalling succeeds but leaves BlockHash as nil. Babylon then dereferences this nil pointer in consensus-critical code paths (notably VerifyVoteExtension, and also proposal-time vote verification), causing a runtime panic.
A vulnerability exists in Babylon’s BLS vote extension processing where a malicious active validator can submit a VoteExtension with the block_hash field omitted from the protobuf serialization. Because protobuf fields are optional, unmarshalling succeeds but leaves BlockHash as nil. Babylon then dereferences this nil pointer in consensus-critical code paths (notably VerifyVoteExtension, and also proposal-time vote verification), causing a runtime panic.
A vulnerability exists in Babylon’s BLS vote extension processing where a malicious active validator can submit a VoteExtension with the block_hash field omitted from the protobuf serialization. Because protobuf fields are optional, unmarshalling succeeds but leaves BlockHash as nil. Babylon then dereferences this nil pointer in consensus-critical code paths (notably VerifyVoteExtension, and also proposal-time vote verification), causing a runtime panic.
A vulnerability exists in Babylon’s BLS vote extension processing where a malicious active validator can submit a VoteExtension with the block_hash field omitted from the protobuf serialization. Because protobuf fields are optional, unmarshalling succeeds but leaves BlockHash as nil. Babylon then dereferences this nil pointer in consensus-critical code paths (notably VerifyVoteExtension, and also proposal-time vote verification), causing a runtime panic.
Adversarial validators can send large vote extensions by using non-existing protobuf tags. This will result in the rejection of the subsequent block proposal. Eventually, all block proposals will be rejected by all validators.
The BIP-322 signature verification does not enforce the SIGHASH value to be SIGHASH_ALL, and therefore is not strictly following the spec.
Sending a message that modifies the validator set at the epoch boundary halts the chain.
Sending transactions with fees different than native Babylon genesis denom (ubbn) leads to chain halt.
Sending transactions with fees different than native Babylon genesis denom (ubbn) leads to chain halt.
Minting large amount of tokens through ibc transfer and then depositing them in validator rewards pool (via DepositValidatorRewardsPool message) can lead to integer overflow panic when calculating cumulative_reward_ratio for the validator. This calculation happens in x/epoching module EndBlocker, thus the panic will halt the chain.
A high vulnerability exists in the Babylon protocol's x/finality module due to a lack of domain separation in signed messages, combined with insufficient validation in the MsgCommitPubRandList handler. Specifically, the handler does not enforce that the submitted Commitment field is 32 bytes long. This allows an attacker to replay a signature originally generated for a different message (e.g., a Proof-of-Possession in MsgCreateFinalityProvider) as a MsgCommitPubRandList. By crafting the message parameters, …