Cilium allows outside actors (world entity) to directly access pods with their internal pod IP, even if they are not exposed explicitly (e.g. via LoadBalancer). A pod that does not authenticate clients and that does not exclude world traffic via network policy may leak sensitive data to an attacker inside the cloud VPC.
Impact An active attacker could let the boot fail on purpose in the initramfs, dropping the serial console into an emergency shell. This gives attackers with access to the serial console full control over the VM. Patches The issue has been patched in v2.6.0. Workarounds none
Impact Attestation user data (such as the digest of the public key in an aTLS connection) was bound to the issuer's TPM, but not to its PCR state. An attacker could intercept a node initialization, initialize the node themselves, and then impersonate an uninitialized node to the validator. In practice, this meant that a CSP insider with sufficient privileges would have been able to join a node under their control …