Advisories for Golang/Github.com/Gtsteffaniak/Filebrowser package

2026

FileBrowser Quantum's path traversal issue in subtitle handler allows any authenticated user to read arbitrary files

The subtitlesHandler endpoint (GET /api/media/subtitles) accepts two user-controlled query parameters: path and name, both of which are used in filesystem operations without sanitization, creating two independent path traversal vectors. The primary vector is the path parameter: it is passed directly to idx.GetRealPath() without calling SanitizeUserPath(), allowing an attacker to escape the storage root and set parentDir to any directory on the host. No existing anchor file is required. The secondary …

FileBrowser: Missing Rate Limiting on Authentication Endpoint Enables Brute Force Attacks

The /api/auth/login endpoint does not implement rate limiting, account lockout, or progressive backoff for repeated authentication failures. As a result, an attacker can perform unlimited login attempts against the endpoint. When combined with the username enumeration timing vulnerability, valid accounts can be identified and then brute-forced without restriction. The risk is further increased by a weak default password policy that only enforces a minimum length of five characters.

FileBrowser Quantum: Path traversal in public share PATCH allows file ops outside shared directory

publicPatchHandler in backend/http/public.go joins user-controlled fromPath and toPath body fields with the trusted d.share.Path BEFORE the downstream sanitizer runs. Because filepath.Join collapses .. segments during the join, the sanitizer in resourcePatchHandler never sees the traversal and the move/copy/rename operates on a path outside the shared directory. The same root-cause pattern was patched for the bulk DELETE endpoint as CVE-2026-44542 (GHSA-fwj3-42wh-8673), but the PATCH handler with the identical pattern was not …

FileBrowser Public Share DELETE API Path Traversal Allows Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion

Attacker-controlled path input is joined with a trusted base path prior to sanitization, allowing traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to escape the intended shared directory. As a result, an unauthenticated attacker possessing a valid public share hash with delete permissions enabled can delete arbitrary files outside the shared directory within the share owner’s configured storage scope.