Advisories for Golang/Github.com/Lxc/Incus/V7/Cmd/Incusd package

(backend).createDependentVolumesFromBackup in internal/server/storage/backend.go contains a cluster of unguarded pointer derefs on every dependent-volume entry's VolumeSnapshots[i], Volume, and Pool sub-fields. An authenticated user with can_create_instances permission on any project can crash the incusd daemon by uploading an instance backup tarball whose dependent_volumes[] block contains a nil snapshot pointer (or omits volume: / pool:). This is a sibling-field variant of the 2026-05-04 batch fix d768f81c0a1d985f35ae56219519822b080bf5e3 ("Properly check dependent volumes on import"). That …

(*backend).CreateCustomVolumeFromBackup in internal/server/storage/backend.go contains an unguarded time.Time dereference on the ExpiresAt field of every volume-snapshot entry in an imported custom-volume backup. An authenticated user with can_create_storage_volumes permission on any project can crash the incusd daemon by uploading a backup tarball whose volume_snapshots[].expires_at field is absent. This is a sibling-field variant of GHSA-r7w7-mmxr-47r9 (CVE-2026-40197). Commit 985a1dedf9f3e7ba729c93b654905ed510de25c2 added if s == nil at the top of the loop body, but did not …

A specially crafted image or instance backup can be used to read or create/write arbitrary files on the host; possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.

Improper validation of user-provided backup compression algorithm leads to argument injection in the constructed command line. This leads to an arbitrary file write on the host, possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.

The S3 protocol upload endpoint is vulnerable to path traversal and allows creation of arbitrary files on the host. This behavior could lead to arbitrary command execution.

An arbitrary file write exists in the Incus client when a malicious image server returns a crafted Incus-Image-Hash header. This can lead to arbitrary command execution as root on the server.

The record-output parameter of the /instances/$name/exec endpoint stores the output of the command in the exec-output directory of the instance. If exec-output is a symlink, file named exec_UUID.stdout and exec_UUID.stderr can be written to an arbitrary location where the .stdout file will contain arbitrary content. This behavior can be abused for arbitrary command execution.

A specially crafted image can be used to read or create/write arbitrary files on the host; possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.

Instance snapshots ignore the restricted.containers.lowlevel=block setting; allowing for arbitrary command execution on the Incus server by abusing lowlevel hooks such as raw.lxc and raw.qemu.