An authorization bypass exists in OAuth2 Proxy as part of the email_domain enforcement option. An attacker may be able to authenticate with an email claim such as attacker@evil.com@company.com and satisfy an allowed domain check for company.com, even though the claim is not a valid email address. The issue ONLY affects deployments that rely on email_domain restrictions and accept email claim values from identity providers or claim mappings that do not …
A configuration-dependent authentication bypass exists in OAuth2 Proxy. Deployments are affected when all of the following are true: OAuth2 Proxy is configured with –reverse-proxy and at least one rule is defined with –skip_auth_routes or the legacy –skip-auth-regex OAuth2 Proxy may trust a client-supplied X-Forwarded-Uri header when –reverse-proxy is enabled and –skip-auth-route or –skip-auth-regex is configured. An attacker can spoof this header so OAuth2 Proxy evaluates authentication and skip-auth rules against …
A configuration-dependent authentication bypass exists in OAuth2 Proxy. Deployments are affected when all of the following are true: Use of skip_auth_routes or the legacy skip_auth_regex * Use of patterns that can be widened by attacker-controlled suffixes, such as ^/foo/.*/bar$ causing potential exposure of /foo/secret * Protected upstream applications that interpret # as a fragment delimiter or otherwise route the request to the protected base path In deployments that rely on …
A configuration-dependent authentication bypass exists in OAuth2 Proxy. Deployments are affected when all of the following are true: Use of skip_auth_routes or the legacy skip_auth_regex * Use of patterns that can be widened by attacker-controlled suffixes, such as ^/foo/.*/bar$ causing potential exposure of /foo/secret * Protected upstream applications that interpret # as a fragment delimiter or otherwise route the request to the protected base path In deployments that rely on …
A regression introduced in v7.11.0 is preventing OAuth2 Proxy from clearing the session cookie when rendering the sign-in page. This only impacts deployments that rely on the sign-in page as part of their logout flow. In those setups, a user may be shown the sign-in page while the existing session cookie remains valid, so the browser session is not actually logged out. On shared workstations be it browsers or devices, …
A configuration-dependent authentication bypass exists in OAuth2 Proxy. Deployments are affected when all of the following are true: OAuth2 Proxy is used with an auth_request-style integration (for example, nginx auth_request) –ping-user-agent is set or –gcp-healthchecks is enabled In affected configurations, OAuth2 Proxy will treat a request with the configured health check User-Agent value as a successful health check regardless of the requested path. This allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to …
A configuration-dependent authentication bypass exists in OAuth2 Proxy. Deployments are affected when all of the following are true: OAuth2 Proxy is used with an auth_request-style integration (for example, nginx auth_request) –ping-user-agent is set or –gcp-healthchecks is enabled In affected configurations, OAuth2 Proxy will treat a request with the configured health check User-Agent value as a successful health check regardless of the requested path. This allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to …