The Tilt HUD server mounts Go's net/http/pprof handlers under /debug with no access control. When the HUD is network-exposed, an attacker can read process memory — including session and apiserver tokens — and hold the process under profiling.
The Tilt HUD HTTP server exposes state-changing and sensitive-read endpoints with no authentication. When the HUD is bound to a non-loopback address, a network attacker can trigger the developer's pre-defined Tiltfile resources, tamper with Tiltfile arguments, read full engine state including the session token, and reach the Tilt apiserver through a token-attaching proxy.
The Tilt HUD WebSocket (/ws/view) is gated by a CSRF token, but the token is served by an unauthenticated endpoint and the upgrader accepts any client that omits an Origin header. When the HUD is network-exposed, an attacker can open the HUD stream and read the developer's session state.