Advisories for Golang/Gitlab.com/Uniget-Org/Cli package

The sigstore check on metadata.json is gated on the wrong side of the condition. LoadMetadata in internal/config/update.go:81 verifies the bundle only when UNIGET_IGNORE_METADATA_SIGNATURE is non-empty, so in a normal run, where nobody sets that variable, the signature is never checked. Setting the variable that is named "ignore the signature" is what turns verification on. That matters because metadata.json populates Tool.Check, and pkg/tool/tool.go:250 runs Tool.Check through /bin/bash -c. That is the …

Path Traversal vulnerability in hook filename handling allows attackers to access and manipulate arbitrary files outside the hooks directory via directory escape sequences like passwd. Details File: hooks.go Lines 135-160 hookFileName := args[0] // User input not validated hookFile = preInstallHooksDir + "/" + hookFileName // Direct concatenation Hook filenames are concatenated directly without sanitizing ../ sequences, allowing directory traversal.

The uniget CLI has a command injection vulnerability in hooks.go line 199 where strings.Split(editor, " ") naively parses the EDITOR environment variable without respecting shell syntax. An attacker can set EDITOR="/path/to/wrapper && id && echo" which gets split into separate arguments, allowing the wrapper script to execute arbitrary commands like id. This was successfully exploited to execute uid=1000(w4nn4d13), confirming code execution is possible. The vulnerability affects hook editing and breaks …

A command injection vulnerability exists in uniget due to unsafe execution of the check field from metadata files using /bin/bash -c. Because the check field is loaded directly from untrusted JSON metadata without validation or sanitization, an attacker can craft malicious metadata that executes arbitrary shell commands on the victim’s system when common uniget operations such as describe, install, update, or inspect are performed. This vulnerability can lead to arbitrary …