golang.org/x/text/language in golang.org/x/text before 0.3.7 can panic with an out-of-bounds read during BCP 47 language tag parsing. Index calculation is mishandled. If parsing untrusted user input, this can be used as a vector for a denial-of-service attack.
golang.org/x/text/language in golang.org/x/text before 0.3.7 can panic with an out-of-bounds read during BCP 47 language tag parsing. Index calculation is mishandled. If parsing untrusted user input, this can be used as a vector for a denial-of-service attack.
An attacker may cause a denial of service by crafting an Accept-Language header which ParseAcceptLanguage will take significant time to parse.
The BCP 47 tag parser has quadratic time complexity due to inherent aspects of its design. Since the parser is, by design, exposed to untrusted user input, this can be leveraged to force a program to consume significant time parsing Accept-Language headers. The parser cannot be easily rewritten to fix this behavior for various reasons. Instead the solution implemented in this CL is to limit the total complexity of tags …
The x/text package before 0.3.3 for Go has a vulnerability in encoding/unicode that could lead to the UTF-16 decoder entering an infinite loop, causing the program to crash or run out of memory. An attacker could provide a single byte to a UTF16 decoder instantiated with UseBOM or ExpectBOM to trigger an infinite loop if the String function on the Decoder is called, or the Decoder is passed to golang.org/x/text/transform.String.
The x/text package for Go has a vulnerability in encoding/unicode that could lead to the UTF-16 decoder entering an infinite loop, causing the program to crash or run out of memory. An attacker could provide a single byte to a UTF16 decoder instantiated with UseBOM or ExpectBOM to trigger an infinite loop if the String function on the Decoder is called, or the Decoder is passed to golang.org/x/text/transform.String.