Advisories for Maven/Org.apache.camel/Camel-Netty-Http package

2026

Apache Camel: Permissive default ObjectInputFilter pattern admits java.net.** and enables DNS-based information disclosure

Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel. The default ObjectInputFilter pattern shipped with several Apache Camel components for defense-in-depth deserialization filtering ('java.;javax.;org.apache.camel.;!*', or the no-'javax.' variant in the aggregation-repository components) uses a recursive 'java.**' glob that admits classes whose hashCode/equals/readObject methods perform network I/O, notably java.net.URL and java.net.InetAddress. When an attacker can deliver a Java-serialized payload to an affected Camel consumer, deserialization of a HashMap (or any collection that …

Apache Camel-Vertx-Http and Camel-Netty-Http: Unsafe Java deserialization of HTTP response bodies via a raw ObjectInputStream when transferException is enabled

Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel. The camel-vertx-http component deserializes HTTP response bodies carrying the Content-Type application/x-java-serialized-object using a raw java.io.ObjectInputStream, without applying any ObjectInputFilter (VertxHttpHelper.deserializeJavaObjectFromStream) This deserialization path is reached only when the producer endpoint is configured with transferException=true (or the component-level allowJavaSerializedObject=true) and throwExceptionOnFailure is left at its default value of true; in that case a backend HTTP response with a 5xx status and the application/x-java-serialized-object …