The /api/settings/database endpoint allows full database export (containing all credentials, API keys, OAuth tokens, and settings) and full database import (complete overwrite) without any authentication requirement beyond the ALWAYS_PROTECTED middleware check, which only validates JWT or CLI token. Combined with other vulnerabilities (e.g., default password, tunnel exposure), this enables complete database takeover.
The 9router dashboard login rate limiter derives the client identity from the attacker-controlled X-Forwarded-For HTTP header. When 9router is directly exposed, or deployed behind a reverse proxy that does not overwrite untrusted forwarding headers, a remote attacker can rotate the X-Forwarded-For value on each login attempt and receive a fresh rate-limit bucket every time. This bypasses the dashboard brute-force protection and makes the login lockout mechanism ineffective.
Multiple critical API security vulnerabilities were discovered in 9Router's Next.js dashboard. The /api/providers endpoints lack authentication entirely, allowing anyone to create, read, update, and delete provider connections. Additionally, /api/usage/stats exposes full plaintext API keys, and /api/usage/request-logs + /api/usage/request-details expose all users' request history and full conversation contents (including system prompts, user messages, assistant responses) without authentication.
9router uses a publicly known hardcoded string "9router-default-secret-change-me" as the fallback of JWT secret for all Dashboard session JWTs when the JWT_SECRET environment variable is not set. Because this secret is committed in the public repository and unchanged across all releases, any unauthenticated remote attacker can forge a valid auth_token cookie and gain full access to dashboard and api (If JWT_SECRET is not set on server) . This vulnerable affected …
POST /api/tunnel/tailscale-install accepts a JSON body with a sudoPassword field and pipes it, followed by the body of https://tailscale.com/install.sh, into a child process spawned as sudo -S sh. The route is not present in the dashboard middleware matcher in src/proxy.js, so the request reaches the handler without invoking dashboardGuard.proxy(). In deployments where the Node process runs as root (Docker images derived from node:* without a USER directive, npm i -g …
The fix for CVE-2026-46339 (unauthenticated RCE via unprotected MCP plugin routes) introduced a local-only access gate in src/dashboardGuard.js that restricts spawn-capable routes (/api/mcp/, /api/tunnel/, /api/cli-tools/*) to loopback requests. The gate determines "local" by inspecting the Host and Origin HTTP headers rather than the TCP source address. When 9router is deployed behind a reverse proxy, tunnel (Cloudflare Tunnel, Tailscale — both natively supported), or is subject to DNS rebinding, these headers …
9router exposes two unauthenticated API endpoints that, when chained together, allow any network-adjacent attacker to execute arbitrary OS commands as the user running the 9router process — with zero prerequisites and no credentials required. The vulnerability exists because the Next.js middleware that enforces authentication (src/proxy.js) only guards 8 explicitly listed routes. The attack surface of /api/cli-tools/* and /api/mcp/* (40+ routes) receives no authentication whatsoever.
A security vulnerability has been detected in decolua 9router up to 0.3.47. The impacted element is an unknown function of the file /api of the component Administrative API Endpoint. The manipulation leads to authorization bypass. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. Upgrading to version 0.3.75 is sufficient to resolve this issue. It is suggested to upgrade the …