Scaffolder actions that interact with source control systems may not consistently enforce the intended credential boundaries under certain configurations. An authenticated user could perform operations with broader access than intended.
An authenticated Backstage user who can read another user's Scaffolder task may receive internal execution data. In deployments where that data contains credentials for an external service, this may permit disclosure and unauthorized changes in that external service.
Deployments that configure sensitive scaffolder.defaultEnvironment.secrets and allow an attacker to create or modify Scaffolder templates are affected. A template author could cause secret-derived values used during template iteration to be persisted in task logs, exposing those values to users with access to the resulting task logs.
An authenticated user with access to affected Scaffolder templates could bypass configured action restrictions. Depending on integration credentials, this could grant unauthorized access to repositories and related source-control resources.
An authenticated internal user may be able to view metadata for scaffolder tasks outside the visibility intended by a deployment's permission policy. Stored task secrets are not included in the affected response, and no integrity or availability impact was identified.
An authenticated user with permission to create and access Scaffolder tasks may, under specific timing and deployment conditions, affect files accessible to the Backstage backend. If backend application files are writable, the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the backend may be compromised.
Under specific template and failure conditions, an authenticated user may be able to retrieve sensitive values from Scaffolder task events. This can expose backend-managed credentials used during task execution.
An authenticated user who can create and read scaffolder tasks may be able to observe sensitive values in task logs in deployments with restrictive action permissions and affected templates. Exploitation requires a denied action whose input contains such a value.
An authenticated Backstage user with permission to create and read relevant scaffolder tasks may be able to infer confidential task data under specific conditions. Successful exploitation requires retained task secrets, visibility of a target task, knowledge of the secret structure, and repeated requests.
Authenticated users with permission to execute scaffolder dry-runs can gain access to server-configured environment secrets through the dry-run API response. Secrets are properly redacted in log output but not in all parts of the response payload. Deployments that have configured scaffolder.defaultEnvironment.secrets are affected.
A malicious scaffolder template can bypass the log redaction mechanism to exfiltrate secrets provided run through task event logs. The attack requires: The ability to register a template in the catalog A victim who executes the malicious template
Multiple Scaffolder actions and archive extraction utilities were vulnerable to symlink-based path traversal attacks. An attacker with access to create and execute Scaffolder templates could exploit symlinks to: Read arbitrary files via the debug:log action by creating a symlink pointing to sensitive files (e.g., /etc/passwd, configuration files, secrets) Delete arbitrary files via the fs:delete action by creating symlinks pointing outside the workspace Write files outside the workspace via archive extraction …