While @hono/node-server waits for the Hono application to handle a WebSocket upgrade request, the socket has no error listener. If the client resets the TCP connection during that time, the resulting ECONNRESET is emitted as an unhandled 'error' event and the process terminates.
@hono/node-server passes the raw request-target to the WHATWG URL parser, which treats a backslash in the path as / and then resolves .. segments. A request for /admin\secret or /public..\admin/secret reaches the application as /admin/secret. A reverse proxy that follows RFC 3986 forwards the backslash unchanged and applies its path-based rules to the original path, so the request reaches a route the proxy is meant to block.
serveStatic decodes the request path a second time after Hono has already decoded it for routing. A crafted request can be routed as one path and served as another, so middleware mounted on a static prefix does not run for a file under that prefix.
A WebSocket upgrade request to an upgradeWebSocket route with a missing or malformed Sec-WebSocket-Key header leaks memory permanently. The request's IncomingMessage is retained in an internal map and a pending promise is never settled, even though no connection is established. Since the route is reachable pre-handshake without authentication, an unauthenticated attacker can flood it to gradually exhaust memory.
On Windows hosts, an encoded backslash (%5C) in the request path decodes to , which the Windows path resolver treats as a separator. serve-static then resolves a single URL segment such as admin\secret.txt into a nested file under the root and serves it, letting an attacker read static files meant to be protected behind prefix-mounted middleware. Directory escape (..) remains blocked.
A path handling inconsistency in serveStatic allows protected static files to be accessed by using repeated slashes (//) in the request path. When route-based middleware (e.g., /admin/*) is used for authorization, the router may not match paths containing repeated slashes, while serveStatic resolves them as normalized paths. This can lead to a middleware bypass.
When using @hono/node-server's static file serving together with route-based middleware protections (e.g. protecting /admin/*), inconsistent URL decoding can allow protected static resources to be accessed without authorization. In particular, paths containing encoded slashes (%2F) may be evaluated differently by routing/middleware matching versus static file path resolution, enabling a bypass where middleware does not run but the static file is still served.