Channel read actions could skip target allowlists. In affected versions, explicit read targets in Microsoft Teams, Feishu, Matrix, and Google Chat could reach channels or rooms outside the configured read policy. This advisory is scoped to caller-supplied targets for message, reaction, pin, member, and related metadata reads in the named plugins. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model or create per-user isolation within one Gateway.
Feishu tools could ignore per-account disablement. In affected versions, a lower-trust caller or configured input path could perform actions that should have required a stronger authorization or policy check. This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.
Feishu permission tools could ignore per-account disablement. In affected versions, a lower-trust caller or configured input path could perform actions that should have required a stronger authorization or policy check. This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is …