An unauthenticated attacker can craft a URL to a server function in an affected TanStack Start app. If someone opens the link, the app can return attacker-controlled HTML from its own origin and run the attacker's JavaScript there. The script can access same-origin data available to that visitor and make requests with their authority.
On May 19th 2026, a new supply chain attack linked to the Mini Shai-Hulud campaign was identified. This package contains malicious code published through a compromised npm maintainer account. The malicious software is part of a coordinated high-volume publish wave targeting popular data visualization and charting ecosystems. It is recommended that all credentials be rotated, npm cache is cleared, the node_modules directory is removed, and all dependencies be rolled back …
On 2026-05-11, between approximately 19:20 and 19:26 UTC, 84 malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* packages were published to the npm registry. The publishes were authenticated via the legitimate GitHub Actions OIDC trusted-publisher binding for TanStack/router, but the publish workflow itself was not modified. The attacker chained three known vulnerability classes — a pull_request_target "Pwn Request" misconfiguration, GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork↔base trust boundary, and runtime memory extraction of …