Private key can be extracted from ECDSA signature upon signing a malformed input (e.g. a string or a number), which could e.g. come from JSON network input Note that elliptic by design accepts hex strings as one of the possible input types
The Elliptic prior to 6.6.0 for Node.js, in its for ECDSA implementation, does not correctly verify valid signatures if the hash contains at least four leading 0 bytes and when the order of the elliptic curve's base point is smaller than the hash, because of an _truncateToN anomaly. This leads to valid signatures being rejected. Legitimate transactions or communications may be incorrectly flagged as invalid.
The Elliptic package 6.5.5 for Node.js for EDDSA implementation does not perform the required check if the signature proof(s) is within the bounds of the order n of the base point of the elliptic curve, leading to signature malleability. Namely, the verify function in lib/elliptic/eddsa/index.js omits sig.S().gte(sig.eddsa.curve.n) || sig.S().isNeg() validation. This vulnerability could have a security-relevant impact if an application relies on the uniqueness of a signature.
In the Elliptic package 6.5.6 for Node.js, EDDSA signature malleability occurs because there is a missing signature length check, and thus zero-valued bytes can be removed or appended.
In the Elliptic package 6.5.6 for Node.js, ECDSA signature malleability occurs because there is a missing check for whether the leading bit of r and s is zero.
In the Elliptic package 6.5.6 for Node.js, ECDSA signature malleability occurs because BER-encoded signatures are allowed.
The package elliptic is vulnerable to Cryptographic Issues via the secp256k1 implementation in elliptic/ec/key.js. There is no check to confirm that the public key point passed into the derive function actually exists on the secp256k1 curve. This results in the potential for the private key used in this implementation to be revealed after a number of ECDH operations are performed.
The Elliptic package before version 6.5.3 for Node.js allows ECDSA signature malleability via variations in encoding, leading '\0' bytes, or integer overflows. This could conceivably have a security-relevant impact if an application relied on a single canonical signature.