swagger-typescript-api walks every $ref value in the input OpenAPI spec and, for any $ref whose target is an http(s):// URL, issues an HTTP GET to that URL during generation (warmUpRemoteSchemasCache). The only URL filter is a regex that matches ^https?:// — there is no private-IP allowlist, no DNS-rebinding protection, no redirect cap, and no same-origin check against the spec source. A malicious OpenAPI spec can therefore force the generator process …
swagger-typescript-api interpolates OpenAPI path strings (the keys of the paths object, e.g. /users/{id}) directly into a JavaScript template literal inside the body of every generated API method, without escaping. A spec path containing ${ … } survives parseRouteName's {x} / :x rewriter verbatim and lands as live JS-template-literal interpolation inside the generated path: ...`` line. Any consumer who calls the affected generated method evaluates the attacker's expression with full importer …
swagger-typescript-api interpolates components.schemas.*.enum[i] string values into the body of generated TypeScript enum declarations without escaping. A malicious enum value can close the enclosing string literal, terminate the enum body, and inject a bare-block IIFE that executes at module load the first time the generated client is imported. The trigger requires no instantiation and no method call — only an import of the generated module. The attacker controls the OpenAPI spec …
swagger-typescript-api interpolates servers[0].url directly into a TypeScript class-body field initializer of the generated fetch HttpClient (templates/base/http-clients/fetch-http-client.ejs:75), without any escaping. A malicious URL containing a " closes the string literal that initializes public baseUrl and exposes the surrounding class body to injection. The most direct exploit declares a new static field whose initializer is an async IIFE — TypeScript evaluates static field initializers at class definition time, which is at module …
swagger-typescript-api interpolates servers[0].url directly into a TypeScript string literal inside the HttpClient constructor body of the generated axios client (templates/base/http-clients/axios-http-client.ejs:71), without any escaping. A malicious URL containing a " closes the string literal and exposes the surrounding object-literal argument of axios.create({…}) to injection. A computed property key whose value is an IIFE executes arbitrary code every time new HttpClient() (or new Api(), which extends HttpClient) is constructed. The attacker controls …
When the developer supplies an –authorizationToken (commonly required to fetch a private spec behind authentication), swagger-typescript-api attaches that token to the Authorization header of every subsequent HTTP request it makes while resolving external $ref URLs in the spec — with no same-origin check, no host allowlist, and no scope-down for cross-origin requests. A malicious OpenAPI spec containing a $ref to an attacker-controlled URL therefore causes the developer's bearer token to …