Advisories for Pypi/Keylime package

The Keylime registrar implemented more strict type checking on version 7.12.0. As a result, when updated to version 7.12.0, the registrar will not accept the format of the data previously stored in the database by versions >= 7.8.0, raising an exception. This makes the Keylime registrar vulnerable to a Denial-of-Service attack in an update scenario, as an attacker could populate the registrar database by creating multiple valid agent registrations with …

A security issue was found in the Keylime registrar code which allows an attacker to effectively bypass the challenge-response protocol used to verify that an agent has indeed access to an AIK which in indeed related to the EK. When an agent starts up, it will contact a registrar and provide a public EK and public AIK, in addition to the EK Certificate. This registrar will then challenge the agent …

A flaw was found in Keylime. Due to their blocking nature, the Keylime registrar is subject to a remote denial of service against its SSL connections. This flaw allows an attacker to exhaust all available connections.

A flaw was found in the keylime attestation verifier, which fails to flag a device's submitted TPM quote as faulty when the quote's signature does not validate for some reason. Instead, it will only emit an error in the log without flagging the device as untrusted.

Impact This vulnerability creates a false sense of security for keylime users – i.e. a user could query keylime and conclude that a parcitular node/agent is correctly attested, while attestations are not in fact taking place. Short explanation: the keylime verifier creates periodic reports on the state of each attested agent. The keylime verifier runs a set of python asynchronous processes to challenge attested nodes and create reports on the …

Keylime does not enforce that the agent registrar data is the same when the tenant uses it for validation of the EK and identity quote and the verifier for validating the integrity quote. This allows an attacker to use one AK, EK pair from a real TPM to pass EK validation and give the verifier an AK of a software TPM. A successful attack breaks the entire chain of trust …