The vulnerability allows an attacker to inject a malicious script into the context of a web page, which can lead to data theft, unauthorized actions on behalf of the user, and other attacks.
Label Studio's S3 storage integration feature contains a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in its endpoint configuration. When creating an S3 storage connection, the application allows users to specify a custom S3 endpoint URL via the s3_endpoint parameter. This endpoint URL is passed directly to the boto3 AWS SDK without proper validation or restrictions on the protocol or destination. The vulnerability allows an attacker to make the application send HTTP …
Label Studio's /projects/upload-example endpoint allows injection of arbitrary HTML through a GET request with an appropriately crafted label_config query parameter. By crafting a specially formatted XML label config with inline task data containing malicious HTML/JavaScript, an attacker can achieve Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). While the application has a Content Security Policy (CSP), it is only set in report-only mode, making it ineffective at preventing script execution. The vulnerability exists because the …
On all Label Studio versions prior to 1.11.0, data imported via file upload feature is not properly sanitized prior to being rendered within a Choices or Labels tag, resulting in an XSS vulnerability.
The following tasks_from_url method in label_studio/data_import/uploader.py performs the SSRF validation (validate_upload_url) before sending the request. def tasks_from_url(file_upload_ids, project, user, url, could_be_tasks_list): """Download file using URL and read tasks from it"""
The following code snippet in Label Studio showed that is a URL passed the SSRF verification checks, the contents of the file would be downloaded using the filename in the URL. def tasks_from_url(file_upload_ids, project, user, url, could_be_tasks_list): """Download file using URL and read tasks from it"""
The following code snippet in Label Studio shows that the only verification check is that the file is an image by extracting the dimensions from the file. def hash_upload(instance, filename): filename = str(uuid.uuid4())[0:8] + '-' + filename return settings.AVATAR_PATH + '/' + filename <3> def check_avatar(files): images = list(files.items()) if not images: return None filename, avatar = list(files.items())[0] # get first file w, h = get_image_dimensions(avatar) <1> if not w …
The following code snippet from the ViewSetSerializer in label_studio/data_manager/serializers.py insecurely creates Filter objects from a JSON POST request to the /api/dm/views/{viewId} API endpoint. @staticmethod def _create_filters(filter_group, filters_data): filter_index = 0 for filter_data in filters_data: filter_data["index"] = filter_index filter_group.filters.add(Filter.objects.create(**filter_data)) filter_index += 1 These Filter objects are then applied in the TaskQuerySet in label_studio/data_manager/managers.py. class TaskQuerySet(models.QuerySet): def prepared(self, prepare_params=None): """ Apply filters, ordering and selected items to queryset :param prepare_params: prepare params …
Below is the code snippet of the Django settings file at label_studio/core/settings/base.py.
Relative Path Traversal in label-studio.
A Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in the Data Import module in Heartex - Label Studio Community Edition versions 1.5.0 and earlier allows an authenticated user to access arbitrary files on the system. Furthermore, self-registration is enabled by default in these versions of Label Studio enabling a remote attacker to create a new account and then exploit the SSRF. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.0.