Advisories for Pypi/Lemur package

When verifying an uploaded certificate, lemur/certificates/verify.py extracts the CRL Distribution Point URL and the OCSP responder URL directly from the certificate's extensions and issues outbound requests to those URLs without scheme restriction or destination allow-listing. An authenticated user holding the operator role (required by StrictRolePermission on POST /certificates/upload) can craft a certificate whose extensions point at internal services - instance metadata endpoints, internal Kubernetes API servers, RFC1918 hosts, link-local addresses …

Field | Value – | – Title | Lemur 1.9.0: any SSO-authenticated user achieves AWS IAM compromise and permanent PKI key access via ACME acme_url SSRF and creator-equality IDOR Component | lemur/lemur/plugins/lemur_acme/acme_handlers.py:161-201 (SSRF), lemur/lemur/certificates/views.py:734 (IDOR), lemur/lemur/auth/views.py:300-308 (SSO auto-provision) CWE | CWE-918 (SSRF) + CWE-639 (Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key) + CWE-285 (Improper Authorization) Attack Prerequisite | A valid SSO session against the deployment's IdP. Lemur auto-provisions any new SSO identity …

lemur.users.service.update() writes a user's new password as plaintext to the users.password column. The User model wires bcrypt hashing to SQLAlchemy's before_insert event but registers no equivalent listener for before_update, and service.update() does not call user.hash_password() after assigning the new value. Every password change performed through the admin-gated PUT /api/1/users/<id> endpoint persists the user's password to the database in cleartext.

The PUT /api/1/roles/<id> handler in lemur/roles/views.py gates only on RoleMemberPermission(role_id).can(), which is satisfied for any user who is already a member of the target role. The handler then passes data["users"] and data["name"] directly to service.update(), permitting any role member to rewrite that role's membership list and name. The companion DELETE handler on the same resource is correctly gated by @admin_permission.require; the asymmetry between PUT and DELETE on identical resources indicates …

StrictRolePermission and AuthorityCreatorPermission in lemur/auth/permissions.py call flask_principal.Permission.init() with zero Needs when their config flags are unset. Both flags defaulted to False in code prior to the fix, so this was the state of any Lemur install that hadn't explicitly opted in. Flask-Principal's Permission.allows() returns True whenever self.needs is empty. The .can() gate therefore passes for every authenticated identity, including the lowest-privilege role Lemur ships (read-only). A user holding only read-only …

Field | Value – | – Title | Lemur 1.9.0: JWT verifier trusts attacker-supplied alg from token header — defense-in-depth gap; chain-dependent ATO with secret disclosure Component | lemur/lemur/auth/service.py:130-137 CWE | CWE-347 (Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature) Attack Prerequisite | Defense-in-depth gap on its own — no single-request exploit against PyJWT 2.x. Single-request ATO requires a separate disclosure issue that leaks LEMUR_TOKEN_SECRET, or a future migration to asymmetric signing without …

Lemur: LDAP Filter Injection enables post-authentication privilege escalation

Lemur: LDAP Authentication Globally Disables TLS Certificate Verification When LDAP_USE_TLS Is Enabled

Duplicate Advisory This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-5fqv-mpj8-h7gm. This link is maintained to preserve external references. Original Description Netflix Lemur before version 1.3.2 used insufficiently random values when generating default credentials. The insufficiently random values may allow an attacker to guess the credentials and gain access to resources managed by Lemur.

The potentially affected generated items include:

This advisory duplicates another.

Lemur 0.1.4 does not use sufficient entropy in its IV when encrypting AES in CBC mode.