The POST /guardrails/test_custom_code endpoint runs user-supplied Python inside a hand-rolled sandbox. The sandbox can be escaped using bytecode-level techniques, allowing arbitrary code execution in the proxy process — which runs as root in the default Docker image. Reaching the endpoint requires a proxy-admin credential in default configurations.
Two endpoints used to preview an MCP server before saving it — POST /mcp-rest/test/connection and POST /mcp-rest/test/tools/list — accepted a full server configuration in the request body, including the command, args, and env fields used by the stdio transport. When called with a stdio configuration, the endpoints attempted to connect, which spawned the supplied command as a subprocess on the proxy host with the privileges of the proxy process. The …
The POST /prompts/test endpoint accepted user-supplied prompt templates and rendered them without sandboxing. A crafted template could run arbitrary code inside the LiteLLM Proxy process. The endpoint only checks that the caller presents a valid proxy API key, so any authenticated user could reach it. Depending on how the proxy is deployed, this could expose secrets in the process environment (such as provider API keys or database credentials) and allow …
The POST /prompts/test endpoint accepted user-supplied prompt templates and rendered them without sandboxing. A crafted template could run arbitrary code inside the LiteLLM Proxy process. The endpoint only checks that the caller presents a valid proxy API key, so any authenticated user could reach it. Depending on how the proxy is deployed, this could expose secrets in the process environment (such as provider API keys or database credentials) and allow …
A database query used during proxy API key checks mixed the caller-supplied key value into the query text instead of passing it as a separate parameter. An unauthenticated attacker could send a specially crafted Authorization header to any LLM API route (for example POST /chat/completions) and reach this query through the proxy's error-handling path. An attacker could read data from the proxy's database and may be able to modify it, …
Duplicate Advisory This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-wxxx-gvqv-xp7p. This link is maintained to preserve external references. Original Description LiteLLM through 2026-04-08 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via bytecode rewriting at the /guardrails/test_custom_code URI.
Three issues combine into a full authentication bypass chain: Weak hashing: User passwords are stored as unsalted SHA-256 hashes, making them vulnerable to rainbow table attacks and trivially identifying users with identical passwords. Hash exposure: Multiple API endpoints (/user/info, /user/update, /spend/users) return the password hash field in responses to any authenticated user regardless of role. Plaintext passwords could also potentially be exposed in certain scenarios. Pass-the-hash: The /v2/login endpoint accepts …
The /config/update endpoint does not enforce admin role authorization. A user who is already authenticated into the platform can then use this endpoint to do the following: Modify proxy configuration and environment variables Register custom pass-through endpoint handlers pointing to attacker-controlled Python code, achieving remote code execution Read arbitrary server files by setting UI_LOGO_PATH and fetching via /get_image Take over other priveleged accounts by overwriting UI_USERNAME and UI_PASSWORD environment variables
When JWT authentication is enabled (enable_jwt_auth: true), the OIDC userinfo cache uses token[:20] as the cache key. JWT headers produced by the same signing algorithm generate identical first 20 characters. This configuration option is not enabled by default. Most instances are not affected. An unauthenticated attacker can craft a token whose first 20 characters match a legitimate user's cached token. On cache hit, the attacker inherits the legitimate user's identity …
After an API Token exposure from an exploited trivy dependency, two new releases of litellm were uploaded to PyPI containing automatically activated malware, harvesting sensitive credentials and files, and exfiltrating to a remote API. Anyone who has installed and run the project should assume any credentials available to litellm environment may have been exposed, and revoke/rotate thema ccordingly.