The vllm/model_executor/weight_utils.py implements hf_model_weights_iterator to load the model checkpoint, which is downloaded from huggingface. It use torch.load function and weights_only parameter is default value False. There is a security warning on https://pytorch.org/docs/stable/generated/torch.load.html, when torch.load load a malicious pickle data it will execute arbitrary code during unpickling.
A flaw was found in the vLLM library. A completions API request with an empty prompt will crash the vLLM API server, resulting in a denial of service.
A vulnerability was found in the ilab model serve component, where improper handling of the best_of parameter in the vllm JSON web API can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS). The API used for LLM-based sentence or chat completion accepts a best_of parameter to return the best completion from several options. When this parameter is set to a large value, the API does not handle timeouts or resource exhaustion …